A summary of the OPB article by Tony Schick (OPB)
June 3, 2026 2 a.m.
A low-income housing program is pouring big money into housing many Oregonians can’t afford
The federal tax credit provides up to $15 billion in subsidies a year to help developers build apartments. It’s created housing that’s often no more affordable than the market rate.
OPB Article Summary (read the complete article from OBP)
The June 3, 2026 OPB/ProPublica investigation, by Tony Schick, examines the federal Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) and its failures in Oregon:
- The LIHTC is the dominant federal housing tool, providing up to $15 billion in tax credits annually and backing nine out of every ten subsidized units built in the U.S. Portland layered local dollars on top, making the incentives hard for developers to pass up. OPB
- The affordability bar is set too high: to qualify, developers only need to rent units to households earning up to 60% of median income — roughly $75,000/year for a family of four in Portland — a threshold now close to what market-rate landlords charge without any subsidy. OPB
- The result is a glut of ~$1,400/month one-bedrooms — manageable for a $75K household, but nearly half the monthly income of someone earning $35,000 at minimum wage. OPB
- Nearly 2,000 Portland subsidized units sit vacant, a pattern repeated in Seattle, the Bay Area, and Denver. Researchers say the program produces housing at income levels that already have a surplus, rather than filling the shortage at the very bottom of the ladder. OPB
- Economists say vouchers would work better: between 1991 and 2024, a dozen studies concluded that spending the same dollars on rental vouchers — letting tenants choose their housing — could benefit as many as twice the number of people per dollar spent. OPB
- A 2017 NPR/Frontline investigation documented fraud and waste in the program, including at least one developer who pocketed credits without ever building the required housing. Jefferson Public Radio
- Congress keeps expanding it anyway: bipartisan support — including from Oregon Sens. Wyden and Cantwell — has made LIHTC the linchpin of U.S. housing policy. The most recent federal spending package included the largest LIHTC expansion in decades, even as Trump simultaneously cut direct rental assistance. OPB
- Oregon’s building boom hasn’t fixed affordability: the state went from ~1,800 affordable units/year pre-pandemic to nearly 5,000 last year, yet rent and home prices continued outpacing incomes, and the vacancy rate in Portland is around 7.6%. OPB
To read the full article from OBP
How does DevNW’s FLORAL HILL TERRACE measure up to the issues brought up in the OPB/ProPublica article research?
The DevNW Application (ST-26-0000, City of Eugene)
The Eugene PDD portal for ST-26-0000 is a Subdivision Tentative Plan filed under EC 9.8500. The public-facing report contains only the file number, the applicable code section, and the date — no applicant name, project description, site address, or supporting documents are visible. eugene-or
Based on the AHTF and public records, this almost certainly corresponds to DevNW’s Floral Hill Community Land Trust project: a proposal to purchase a 3.9-acre site on Floral Drive in Eugene and develop a 36-unit subdivision of affordable homes — a mix of townhomes and detached homes for ownership via a Community Land Trust — targeting households earning up to 80% AMI ($71,300/year for a family of four). Right Now Oregon
Why the DevNW Application Is Deficient — A Critique
Viewed against the OPB article’s findings, the DevNW/Floral Hill application raises several serious concerns:
1. AMI Targeting Is Too High The project targets households earning up to 80% AMI, which in Eugene’s context is well above the households who are actually housing-insecure. The OPB article’s core critique of LIHTC applies directly here: subsidized programs calibrated at 60–80% AMI largely serve people who could compete in the private market, not those sleeping outside. DevNW’s application makes no apparent commitment to serve households below 50% or 30% AMI. Right Now Oregon
2. Same Obstacle, Same Proposal — No Demonstrated Demand Analysis At the AHTF Advisory Committee meeting, a committee member noted this was “the same proposal with the same obstacles.” A deficient application would fail to explain what changed to make the project viable this time — no updated market study, no evidence of pent-up demand at the 80% AMI ownership tier in south Eugene, and no analysis of whether a Community Land Trust structure actually reaches the neediest households in Eugene’s current market. Eugene
3. The Application Record Itself Is Nearly Empty Under Eugene Code 9.8510, a subdivision tentative plan must be prepared by an Oregon licensed land surveyor, include a preliminary title report, cover all contiguous property under the same ownership, and include a phasing plan with sequencing for streets and public improvements. The publicly available ST-26-0000 record contains none of this — no surveyor certification, no title report, no phasing narrative, no written statement on affordability election as required by EC 9.8510(5). Whether this reflects an incomplete submission or a portal display limitation, it creates a transparency problem for public review. Eugene Code
4. Ownership Model Doesn’t Address the Rental Crisis The OPB article focuses on the failure of the LIHTC to help renters — the people most at risk of homelessness. DevNW’s homeownership/CLT model, while laudable in principle, does nothing to address Eugene’s rental affordability crisis. In 2022, 31.3% of Eugene households were severely rent-burdened, and Lane County counted over 4,500 unhoused individuals in 2024. A 36-unit for-sale subdivision, however well-structured, is a drop in the bucket and misses the most acute need entirely. aol
5. No Discussion of Subsidy Depth or Long-Term Affordability Covenant The application (as publicly visible) contains no written commitment about how long units remain affordable, what resale restrictions the CLT imposes, or what happens if a household’s income rises above 80% AMI. These are precisely the accountability gaps the OPB article identifies as endemic to tax-credit-funded housing.
Bottom line: The DevNW ST-26-0000 filing exemplifies the same structural problem the OPB article diagnoses at the macro level — public subsidy dollars flowing into housing for moderate-income buyers rather than the deeply poor, with minimal public documentation to allow meaningful scrutiny of whether the investment serves the people who need it most.
